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Abstract
What are the consequences of conducting trade with transitional Russia?
This paper takes a look at possible consequences for trade when trade con-
tracts cannot be fully enforced across international borders. It investigates the
possibility of improved stability in trade by taking into account the incentive
constraints of importers as well as exporters. The paper looks into stability
determinants in Norwegian data on exports of fish to Russia in the years 1996-
2004.
Focus is set on the need for Norwegian firms to strategically handle differ-
ences in institutional structure between Norway and Russia. The formal model
shows that strategic thinking could influence trade stability and that this line
of research should not be ignored. The empirical analysis finds support for the
ideas laid out in preceding chapters.
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Summary
What are the consequences of conducting trade with transitional Russia? This
paper takes a look at possible consequences for trade when trade contracts can-
not be fully enforced across international borders. It investigates the possibility
of improved stability in trade by taking into account the incentive constraints
of importers as well as exporters. The paper looks into stability determinants
in Norwegian data on exports of fish to Russia in the years 1996-2004.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the consequences for bilateral trade
of the difference in institutional design between Russia and Norway. There is
no doubt that the economic institutions of Norway and Russia are dissimilar
in many ways. Some times one can discover that an institution typical of the
one country lacks a counterpart in the other country - defined property rights
to real estate is one example.
In international trade an individual or a firm from one country that wishes
to do trade in another country must learn the ”rules of the game” in the coun-
try he wishes to do business. For the case of Norway and Russia, a Norwegian
firm will have to learn to use such institutions as the Russian judicial system to
enforce contracts. In some circumstances the Norwegian firm will discover that
the Russian counterpart of a Norwegian economic institution such as property
rights enforcement is not taken care of by the same authority as in Norway. Such
a learning process is bound to take time. Until two counties have an extensive
history of bilateral trade one cannot expect firms from one country to benefit
from the institutions of the foreign country to the same degree as firms who are
from this foreign country and to whom these institutions are familiar. When
one or both sides in international trade experience higher transaction costs than
they would conducting domestic trade because their market institutions differ
from the institutions of their partner - I choose to speak of institutional incom-
patibility.
The concept of institutional incompatibility is interesting in connection with
Norwegian-Russian trade. Institutional barriers to entry are high on the agenda
of firms with interests in Russia, but there has been done little research in this
field. For example 66,2 % of the respondents in the Norwegian Confederation
of Enterprize’s survey found activity related to the Russian market ”hard, but
not impossible”. Furthermore the most significant barriers to working in Russia
after government bureaucracy were corruption, language and communication
and Russian business culture. The barriers experienced by Norwegian firms are
of grave significance, since they effectively block participating in the wide range
of contract enforcement measures employed by Russian firms.
To illustrate the possibility of strategic action on behalf of Norwegian ex-
porters I use chapter 2 to set up a simple model of Norwegian export flows to
Russia. The main contribution of this model is to point out a new dimension
of the fact that there are two ends to the deal also in international trade. In
the model, trade stability is effected by firms’ decision on whether to stick with
their current partner or to engage in search activity. This decision depends on
a cost-benefit analysis of the two alternatives. The results show that under the
assumption of incomplete contract enforcement stability in trade relations can
be explained among other things as a function of a firm’s export price relative
to the mean export price of the given product. We also find that the existence
of sunk entry costs into the export market reduces stability. This result is in
clear opposition to prevailing trade theory of sunk costs. Despite it’s ambition
the model remains crude and subject to future improvements.
In chapter 3 I investigate whether or not the predictions made by the the-
oretical model have empirical support by running a series of regressions on a
micro level data set of Norwegian seafood exports to Russia. The implied price-
stability relationship is found consistent with the data and the coefficients of
relative price and squared relative price remain significant throughout a series
of regressions.
There is some evidence that reduced search costs increases stability. How-
ever the distinction between out of market search costs and in market search
costs is not drawn in the empirical treatment and the positive effect of a firm’s
experience in the Russian market may be a result of learning the rules of the
game and utilization of strategic pricing rather than reduction in out of market
search costs through learning. Furthermore improved stability is closely associ-
ated with time. As the years pass trades seem to become increasingly stable.
On these grounds it is tempting to draw the conclusion that as firms come to
know the market and the rules of the game, they increasingly price in a binding
way - increasing stability.
Alternatively we might be witness to a taˆtonnement process in a maturing
market where exporters offering disequilibrium prices fall out of the market and
reenter offering prices closer to equilibrium. Elaborating such an approach could
explain both the price convergence and increasing stability observed in the data.
This paper focuses on the need for Norwegian firms to strategically handle
differences in institutional structure between Norway and Russia. The formal
model shows that strategic thinking could influence trade stability and that this
line of research should not be ignored. The empirical analysis finds support for
the ideas laid out in preceding chapters.
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The goal of this paper is to investigate the consequences for bilateral trade of
the difference in institutional design between Russia and Norway. There is no
doubt that the economic institutions of Norway and Russia are dissimilar in
many ways. Some times one can discover that an institution typical of the one
country lacks a counterpart in the other country - defined property rights to
real estate is one example.1 Before continuing I lend on Douglas North for a
definition of economic institutions.
”Institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally,
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”
North (1990)
North (1990) focuses on the need for institutions to ensure low cost enforce-
ment of contracts. Institutions’ ability to provide such low cost enforcement is
what makes them efficient. Without efficient institutions many transactions will
not take place or will lead to distribution of property rights different from what
would be the case with efficient institutions. The absence of efficient institutions
renders the ex-ante distribution of property rights consequential to the ex-post
results of trade.
In international trade an individual or a firm from one country that wishes
to do trade in another country must learn the ”rules of the game” in the country
he wishes to do business. For the case of Norway and Russia, a Norwegian firm
will have to learn to use such institutions as the Russian judicial system to
enforce contracts. In some circumstances the Norwegian firm will discover that
the Russian counterpart of a Norwegian economic institution such as property
rights enforcement is not taken care of by the same authority as in Norway. Such
a learning process is bound to take time. Until two counties have an extensive
1It has only recently become possible to buy, own and sell real estate.
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history of bilateral trade one cannot expect firms from one country to benefit
from the institutions of the foreign country to the same degree as firms who are
from this foreign country and to whom these institutions are familiar.
In short - institutions that are efficient with respect to internal domestic
trade might be inefficient with respect to international trade. When domesti-
cally efficient institutions turn inefficient because foreign firms lack the know-
how to utilize them one can speak of institutional incompatibility as the cause.
Institutional incompatibility is the term to be used when describing a
situation where users from society A experience different transaction
costs in society B then domestic users of economic institutions in
society B because these institutions are somehow different from the
economic institutions in society A and users from society A have yet
to learn how to use the economic institutions in society B.
Belloc (2006) suggests institutional diversity as one of the main ”hidden”
trade barriers today. According to her, institutional diversity necessitates the
increased gathering of information and investment in trade relations. Such activ-
ity involves sunk costs which might help explain why seemingly similar countries
trade relatively more with each other - contrary to the theory of comparative
advantage. In this paper I investigate the possible consequences of one result
of institutional incompatibility - imperfect contract enforcement. International
trade is in many cases governed by incomplete contracts characterized by imper-
fect contract enforcement (Belloc 2006) . Under such circumstances strategic
action may be taken by trading partners to avoid moral hazard and ex-post
opportunism, which leads me to formulate the following working hypothesis for
this paper:
Due to incomplete contracts and imperfect contract enforcement price can be
used strategically to influence trade stability. The extraordinary entry-exit
behavior of Norwegian seafood exporters into the Russian market as observed
by Melchior (2006) , can in part be explained the choice of price by exporting
Norwegian firms.
To illustrate the possibility of strategic action I use chapter 2 to set up a
simple model of Norwegian export flows to Russia. In chapter 3 I investigate
whether or not the predictions made by the theoretical model have empirical
support by running a series of regressions on a micro level data set of Norwegian
seafood exports to Russia. The results show that under the assumption of
incomplete contract enforcement stability in trade relations can be explained
among other things as a function of a firm’s export price relative to the mean
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export price of the given product. We also find that the existence of sunk entry
costs into the export market reduces stability. This result is in clear opposition
to prevailing trade theory of sunk costs. In works such as Dixit (1989) sunk
costs are claimed to increase stability by a hysteresis argument.
Entering a foreign market involves sunk costs. The investment is made
when market conditions and expected trade volume is large enough to cover the
investment costs. If conditions deteriorate after entry the firm might still stay
in the foreign market because the investment was sunk and no longer part of
the future profitability calculation. Such an approach ignores a very important
aspect of trade and international investment - the foreign partner. There are
always two parties to a transaction. If the firm exports a product there is a
foreign buyer of this product. If the firm invests in a plant there is a seller of
the plant itself or the real estate on which the plant is to be built. In any case
property rights are being shifted. Contracts and institutions are at play. I am
not the first to emphasize the role of contracts, the concept of enforceability
and strategic action of the trading partners in international trade. Grow and
Swinnen (2001) discuss how firms have vertically integrated up- and downstream
of each other to avoid holdups through commitment and control. Marin and
Schnitzer (2002) discuss extensively the effects on trade when contracts cannot
be enforced - both in transition economies and in international trade. They
suggest buy-back contracts, hostage holding and barter as some of the remedies
to keep trade going. In international trade they focus on trade between state
controlled socialist economies and partners in the west. Today the state in post-
socialist countries has only a negligible role in international goods trade. Trade is
conducted between much smaller players. Thus the trade schemes described by
Marin and Schnitzer are not feasible for players such as Norwegian fish exporters.
While trade upholding arrangements such as buy-back contracts are no longer
possible, market economy institutions such as contract enforcement have still to
become fully developed. Herein lie the main contributions of this paper. Firstly
I show how trade is subject to the strategic decisions of the players and secondly
I show that when the strategic considerations of both parties to the transaction
are taken into consideration sunk costs have a quite different effect on stability
in international trade. Anderson and Young (2006) advocate a similar approach
where they discuss repudiation and the distribution of traders between spot and
contract (futures) markets. My approach departs from theirs. When considering
a situation where the number of buyers exceeds the number of sellers Anderson
and Young contend that the contracted price is determined by buyers switching
between the spot and contract markets until the price they expect to pay in
both is same. My point of departure is that sellers can strategically choose
their contract price and thus keep buyers in the contract market by meeting the
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
buyers’ incentive constraints.
For the remainder of this chapter I will shortly discuss the role of institu-
tions and try to describe the nature of incompatibility between Norwegian and
Russian economic institutional design.
The Coase Theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs the ef-
ficient outcome will prevail irrespective of initial property rights allocations
because interested parties will bargain privately till all mutual gains from trade
have been exhausted (Coase 1960). Coase’s main point was that the efficient
outcome does not always prevail because the neoclassical assumption of zero
transaction costs does not hold. Since then the Coase Theorem has been proven
not to hold, also because of asymmetric information. The comic strip Dilbert
proves this quite elegantly, see appendix B. Since transaction costs are gener-
ally existent ex-ante property rights allocations have a big impact on economic
outcomes. Yeager (1999) calls upon institutions to ”define and enforce property
rights”. Institutions are needed to verify if the terms of a sales contract have
been fulfilled. Amount, quality, time of delivery and amount of payment are all
topics for potential dispute. If institutions are not in place, many trades will
not take place and hinder the efficient outcome.
Institutions need not be be buildings with bureaucrats and a system of en-
forcement such as the police. Trade takes place even in societies without written
laws, a judicial system and public police. Trade also took place in western so-
ciety before the current system of governance was developed. Relevant for this
paper are the institutions of contract enforcement. The way a society organizes
its contract enforcement can be divided into two major categories - rule- and
relation-based governance. Under rule-based governance contracts are enforced
by a third party - the symbiosis of legislative, judicial and executive powers. In
economic modeling this third party is generally referred to as the courts. Under
relation-based governance contracts are self-enforcing. The loss from breaching
a contract without third party interference is sufficient to avoid such behavior.
Formal institutions are replaced by mechanisms such as reputation, contingent
contracting, collective punishment and more. Kandori (1992) discusses society’s
ability to convey an agent’s history when observability is not perfect and the
possibility for collective punishment or community enforcement. Dixit (2003)
looks at how the mechanism of collective punishment is influenced by community
size.
Every society is characterized by both types of governance. In many cases
taking a dispute to court is considered a last resort. Also in our society the
role of reputation and other means of relational governance should not be under
estimated. There is though a key characteristic that can be used to differentiate
between rule- and relation-based systems of governance. The success of out of
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court dispute regulation can be attributed to the credible threat of reaching a
binding verdict in court. Economic agents in conflict might prefer going to court
for a verdict to accepting the full economic loss from contract breach, but might
also prefer reaching the same verdict themselves without the court because they
don’t have to carry the, in many cases substantial, costs of a law suit. Thus
the formal institutions play an important, though not necessarily active role in
a rule-based system of contract enforcement. If a verdict in court is to costly
to reach, or it is not binding, and agents prefer the full loss of contract breach
to a law suit then formal institutions play no role in contract enforcement. In
such a situation relation-based governance prevails.
The demarkation line has been drawn up as a background for Dixit’s con-
cept of a ”clash of expectations” (Dixit, 2006). Different systems of governance
naturally imply different patterns of optimal strategic behavior. The prerequi-
site for agents being rational is that they choose strategies that are optimal, i.e.
maximize their expected payoff. The question of which strategies are optimal
is more then often contingent on the strategies chosen by the agent’s ”oppo-
nents”. Thus a major part of choosing one’s own optimal strategy is predicting
other players’ optimal behavior. If a player belonging to one system of gover-
nance and attempts to predict the optimal responses of a player belonging to
a different system of governance, then unawareness of differing system origin
could have intriguing consequences. Both players, expecting that the opposing
player(s) belong to the same system of governance, predict a set of best response
strategies. When strategies are played the opposing player(s)’ responses could
significantly differ from the expected. The opposing players might be playing
strategies that initially were assigned zero probability. Such unexpected behav-
ior should lead a real life player to question if he has fully understood the rules
of the game. If his beliefs about the rules of the game are not updated, the
rationality of opposing players is consequentially put to question. The situa-
tion described here can be described as a ”clash of expectations”, the players
differing expectations regarding system of governance do not yield correct pre-
dictions. What we have seen described here is a direct result of the presence of
institutional incompatibility. If the players had learned the rules of the game
in the opposing player(s)’ society, they would be able produce accurate predic-
tions. This issue might at first glance seem a trivial one, but Li (2003) shows
that the transition from one system of governance to another in liberalizing
Asian economies lead to an outburst of speculation and attributes the Asian
Crisis to the incompatibility of relation- and rule-based systems of government.
Li (2003) argues that when trading partners from rule- and relation based sys-
tems of contract enforcement meet, and the rule-accustomed (western) partner
underestimates the role of relational enforcement in the second country, then
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the ”clash of expectations” may lead to increased risk for the western partner
and a ”rush in and rush out” investment behavior. Thus the more similar are
two national institutional environments, the higher will the trade be between
these two countries. This is also the conclusion of Anderson and Marcouiller
(1999, 2002) . They find that insecure institutions constrain trade as much as
tariffs do, and suggest good institutional support as simple explanation for the
disproportionate trade between rich, capital abundant countries. Their argu-
ment’s strength is that it does not conclude that poor labor abundant countries
should be trading predominantly among themselves.
There are several different views on contract enforcement in post-socialist
Russia. Research has been conducted over time so the various conclusions might
be a result of development. Kossykh and Sarychev (2000) choose the intriguing
approach of studying contract enforcement out of steady state. If both systems
of governance evolve together with the economy, then updating one’s beliefs is
further complicated for western agents active in the Russian market.
Hendley, Murrel and Ryterman (2000) draw up a picture of Russian firms’
transactional strategies based on survey data from 1997 indicating that that
these do not differ much from the strategies of western companies. They find
that Russian firms do not, contrary to common beliefs, rely heavily on pri-
vate protection organizations - the mafia. Russian firms prefer a combination
of informal and formal business meetings to resolve disputes and employ the
judicial system if the former methods do not deliver. Prepayment is common-
place, but the fraction of total payment is reduced if the buyer offers some
property for hostage. Frye (2002) on the other hand using survey data from
post-crisis 1998 grants private protection organizations a more significant role.
His results are ambiguous. On the one hand Frye concludes that the private
protection organizations are unwanted by small businesses, on the other hand
these organizations provided not only protection from rival private protection
organizations, but also credit. A third of the respondents who had been in
contact with a private protection organization said the organization had helped
enforce contracts. Kossykh and Sarychev (2000) claim that Johnson, McMillan
and Woodruff (1999) provide evidence that ”it is indeed the insecure contract
environment that hinders investment, not the lack of outside finance”.
Centralized planning in the Soviet Union and the failure to take into account
transportation costs allowed an economic geography where inputs where fetched
from one production facility in one corner of the Union and transported to an-
other production facility in another corner of the Union. This system allowed a
certain input to by supplied by one or a few locations, in many cases far away. In
result when the Union collapsed a few large upstream production facilities were
left with a multitude of downstream clients all over the former Union. After the
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annihilation of the central planning ministry, compliance with contracts was no
longer enforced by a third party. The fact that the different production facilities
were now located in different independent countries complicated enforcement by
the national courts. The distance from upstream to downstream companies, if
one is to believe the conclusions of Dixit (2003), complicated relational gover-
nance of contracts. Firms where forced to find different ways of securing inputs
for their production. Johnson and Kroll (1991) describe the beginning of re-
structuring and vertical integration on a more narrow geographical basis. The
issue of ensuring compliance to contract lead to a rise of barter among Rus-
sian enterprizes. Although barter was common in the Soviet economy Seabright
(2000) finds an explosion of the practice throughout the 1990s after a small
decline during the early transition years. Marin and Schnitzer (2002) suggest
that barter was used to reduce transaction costs in connection with contract
enforcement. A seller would be more willing to accept a barter payment than
a future cash payment because it is much harder for the buyer to later claim
that he does not have the merchandise than to claim he has no cash. In case of
forced contract enforcement a tangible good is more easy to seize than money
because of underdeveloped financial institutions. Guriev (2001) provides a for-
mal model of firms’ choice of payment based on the transaction costs associated
will money, veksels and tangible goods. The underlying notion is insufficient
property rights enforcement.
The concept of institutional incompatibility is interesting in connection with
Norwegian-Russian trade. Institutional barriers to entry are high on the agenda
of firms with interests in Russia, but there has been done little research in this
field. For example 66,2 % of the respondents in the Norwegian Confederation
of Enterprize’s survey (NHO 2003) found activity related to the Russian mar-
ket ”hard, but not impossible”. Furthermore the most significant barriers to
working in Russia after government bureaucracy were corruption, language and
communication and Russian business culture. Hendley, Murrel and Ryterman
(2000) describe a variety of relational contract enforcement measures used by
Russian firms. The barriers experienced by Norwegian firms are of grave signif-
icance, since they effectively block participating in the wide range of contract
enforcement measures employed by Russian firms. Norwegian firms are forced
to bring their disputes to court; a procedure that is lengthy and far from the
preferred even when in domestic disputes.
Understanding the effects, and process, of institutional incompatibility might
help us avoid some of the risk from moral hazard as described by Li (2003),
and perhaps reduce sunk costs that arise from being forced to participate in
relational contracting in a foreign environment. Such a task is naturally beyond
the scope of this paper, but I believe that an institutions approach to trade and
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investment in Russia deserves increased attention. I hope at least to contribute
to increased attention by means of this paper.
Chapter 2
A Search Model
In this chapter I will try to give an example of how incomplete contract enforce-
ment can affect trade between Norway and Russia. The general goal is to shed
light on the effect on trade of the disparity between institutions of economic
governance. Because players cannot ex ante credibly commit to a contractual
arrangement, the degree to which a trade relation continues over time is subject
to the strategic considerations of the players. As we shall see when the actions
of both parties’ of a trade relation are endogenous, the presence of sunk search
costs might serve to destabilize the trade relation. We shall also see how un-
der certain circumstances, price can be used strategically to make the contract
self-enforcing. The following model is by no means intended to be general, nor
does it claim to accurately capture the dynamics of Norwegian-Russian trade.
It is my hope that it serves as a probable explanation of instability in exports
to Russia, thus justifying further research.
In the model, trade stability is effected by firms’ decision on whether to stick
with their current partner or to engage in search activity. This decision depends
on a cost-benefit analysis of the two alternatives.
2.1 Some Intuition
Any Norwegian firm that wishes to export to Russian market, must match with
a Russian importer who is willing to by the good in question. The model’s
predictions are to be tested against data on seafood exports. Therefore the
good in question will from now on be referred to as fish.
den Butter and Mosch (2003) distinguish three stages in a trade transaction
- contact, contract and control. Each stage has its associated transaction costs.
In the contact stage traders have to invest in search efforts to find potential
buyers / suppliers. In a fish export context such costs might arise from adver-
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tising, traveling and attending fish expos, or services from an export promotion
organization such as the Norwegian Seafood Export Council (NSEC). Costs in
the contract stage are related to the writing of the contract, that is reaching an
agreement on the terms of the trade transaction. Indeed this may be no easy
task. First negotiating in two languages through an interpreter, costs money
and time. Misunderstandings can arise due to different paradigms. Something
that is assumed to be unproblematic for a Norwegian trader using Norway as a
reference point, may in fact be not at all a trivial issue for the Russian trader.
For example labeling of goods, and goods declaration are serious issues. Con-
sequences might be dire if papers are not filled out correctly. Undocumented
cargo, is not simply not allowed to enter the country until correct paperwork is
in place, but might be confiscated and the means of transport arrested until fines
are payed 1. Such delays are costly and care must be taken in the contracting
process to avoid them. Firms in the model must therefore incur a search cost
in order to establish a trade relation and enter the market. These search costs
are assumed to be sunk. This is an assumption in line with the theory of sunk
costs in international trade.2
For firms that are already in the export action, search costs are likely to be
lower. Having already contracted once, important lessons have been learned and
one can apply the same trade scheme to a different partner. Furthermore, firms
that export to one importer might get to be known among other importers,
since these most likely monitor each others actions and trade relations. Docu-
mentation of such effects is not directly available, but Medin (2006) finds that
when seafood firms already export a good to a certain country, chances increase
that they next period not only will continue exporting this good to this coun-
try, but chances increase that they will enter this market with a new product.
Firms learn from being in the market, reducing the cost of entering with new
products. In the model, this insight finds a slightly different application. Firms
that are already in the market have lower search costs than firms that are out
of the market. Firms that have been in the market, do not of course necessarily
lose the experience and learning they have been through. But it is assumed that
crucial in market benefit is lost if one falls out of the export-import action. Thus
firms that are out of the export-import action must incur higher search costs
then firms that are in. A justification for such an assumption can be found in
Roberts and Tybout (2006). They find that after a two-year absence the reen-
try costs of Columbian chemicals exporters are not significantly different from
those faced by a new exporter. The goal of this study is not to investigate why
1Source: Eimskip, liberal quotation of Trond Lorentzen - Company Representative at an
NMC II logistics workshop in St. Petersburg Nov. 2006.
2Sunk costs in international trade are treated in among others Dixit (1989) and Roberts
and Tybout (1997).
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firms enter initially, but what effects stability once they have entered. Since
initial entry cost can be assumed to be generally sunk, they do not effect the
strategic decision process that is subject to analysis in the model. These costs
are therefore ignored. In the beginning of the game firms find themselves in the
export-import action without any further explanation as to how they got there.
In interest of expositional simplicity out of market search costs are modeled as
a linear transformation of in market search costs.
In the model it is assumed that Norwegian firms set the price at which they
wish to trade and then match-up with a Russian partner. I assume for simplicity
zero production costs. Pairing is assumed to be random. Since there is a fair
amount of price variation in the data, the assumption of an exogenous market
price does not hold and I choose to view price as a strategic variable available
to Norwegian firms. The Norwegian firms can be viewed as price setters. They
might for example operate with a reservation price strategy. As long as the price
offered by a Russian importer is over the reservation price, they accept. Such a
reservation price might be a function of among others the firms cost structure,
general price developments or some targeted mark-up on marginal cost. In any
case, where firms choose to place themselves along the price distribution is in
the model considered a strategic choice. If firms are pricing equal to marginal
costs, then this strategic choice has a corner solution. In the modeling I abstract
from firms’ cost structure.
Once every Norwegian firm has set its price, paired-up with a Russian part-
ner and the transaction as been carried out the price distribution becomes know.
The NSEC for example publishes monthly price statistics for all major mar-
kets. Firms then have the possibility to update their believes concerning feasible
prices. Norwegian firms might see an opportunity to increase the price at which
they sell, by contracting with a new partner. The converse applies to Russian
firms. Of course contracting with a new partner is associated with a cost as
explained above.
The main idea in the model is that Norwegian firms sign long run contracts
with their Russian partners. They agree to deliver a certain amount at a certain
price for some specified amount of periods. But these contracts are subject to
incomplete legal contract enforcement. A natural consequence is that only pay-
ment or delivery default in the next period can be legally considered a contract
breach. Two periods ahead, both the Norwegian and Russian partners are free
to scrap the contract in favor of a new partner. Long run contracts in trade with
Russia are subject to ex-post opportunism. Firms can of course choose to stick
with their current partner, but this decision is taken after weighing costs up
against expected gain. The details of this procedure are exposed in the formal
modeling below.
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Decisions on what price to set, whether to stay with one’s current partner
are part of a sequential process. The model therefore takes on the shape of a
dynamic game. Often the sustainability of a cooperative equilibrium is shown in
the framework of an infinitely or indefinitely repeated game. Because I introduce
a multitude of explanatory variables an infinitely repeated game would lead to
a quite tedious algebraic solution of the game. By assuming that no Russian
firm wants to remain out of the market for ever and that this is the fate for
firms that repeatedly renege, the cooperative equilibrium can be sustained even
in the setting of a finite game. Thus, as it does not change the final results, I
choose to stick to a finite game in the formal modeling.
Firms enter the market having first paired in period t. Simultaneously Rus-
sian firms have the opportunity to renege the contract by defaulting on their
payment3. Russian firms can not in practice be held accountable for such be-
havior. Unclarity as to who on the Russian side is in fact responsible, might
make a lawsuit unreasonably lengthy and expensive 4. Firms might restructure
and reappear under new guise, making them hard for Norwegian exporters to
recognize and even harder to prosecute. In the model, if a Russian firm reneges
it ”lays low” and leaves the market for one period. Reentering is associated
with a sunk cost even greater than the usual out of market search cost. It seems
plausible that defaulting firms have to make some additional effort to cover their
tracks (i.e. hide their history). Defaulting firms might have to go through a
costly termination and re-registration procedure. Changing their name might
also cause confusion damaging the firms’ relation with other (e.g. downstream)
partners. For simplicity it is assumed that firms with repeated defaults are
subject to costless identification by Norwegian firms. The default alternative is
therefore considered only once, and does not enter the profit function of default-
ing firms again. It is also assumed for simplicity that if firms find it non-optimal
to default in the current period, they will also ignore this option in assessing
future expected profit. The main focus of this paper is the stability issues in
the static sub-game of the cooperative equilibrium. The renegation aspect of
the game is added to give grounds for an extended discussion.
Given that the Russian firm does not cheat, cooperative payoffs are realized
in period t+1 and both firms can choose to invest in search efforts this period.
Teaming up with a new partner will effect payoff in period t + 2. The goal of
3Norwegian firms could also in theory have such an option, but it seems intuitively less
likely and does not alter the conditions for further discussion. Such a notion concurs with
Dixits (2006) remark that it is easier for agents from a relation-based system of governance
to utilize the institutions of a rule-based system of governance than vice versa. Hence this
aspect is dropped.
4Seafood import in Russia is to a large extend a gray business. I order for an importer to
survive, he is dependent on a large apparatus of double bookmaking and Swiss bank accounts,
Svein Ruud Troika Seafoods.
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the model is to show how under incomplete contract enforcement the amount
of stability in trade relations can become effected by strategic choice. Stability
in trade, i.e. abidance of the long term contract, is achieved when both part-
ners find it preferable to stay with each other and not search. The stay-search
decisions take the form of a static game, the payoffs of which realize in period
t + 2. This static sub-game will serve as the foundation for the empirical sta-
bility analysis. The expected payoff in this sub-game naturally enters into the
payoff calculation in period t regarding whether or not to renege the contract.
In order to isolate potential determinants of trade stability I build a number
of export price intervals compatible with the players’ incentive constraints as
to choosing between the strategies Stay and Search. In particular I deduce the
interval for which Stay is the dominant strategy for each player. Under certain
circumstances these intervals overlap, rendering Stay simultaneously dominant
for both players.
Anderson and Young (2006) provide an intriguing model of incomplete con-
tract enforcement in international trade. They consider a situation of excess de-
mand, when the number of buyers exceeds the number of buyers. They provide
an explanation to contract repudiation through shocks to the traders outside
options and following increased bargaining power in the spot market. Shocks are
unknown ex-ante and realized only after contracts have been signed. A buyer
who after having contracted realizes is true outside option, i.e. the price of the
good in his domestic market, might consider repudiating the contract. If this
price is lower than the expected price in the spot market the trader experiences
increased bargaining power in this market and might choose to repudiate in
search of a better deal. They also provide an explanation to why in some coun-
tries institutions of contract enforcement are underdeveloped despite the fact
that the same authors in an earlier paper show that all traders under certain cir-
cumstances will be better off with impartial third-party enforcement (Anderson
and Young, 2000). In the context of Norwegian fisheries exports to Russia there
are a couple of Anderson and Young’s assumptions that can be questioned. On
issue is the realism of the buyers outside option. Norway has been the mar-
ket leader in Russia when it comes to fisheries exports and it is questionable
whether fisheries products can be obtained from some other source at a price
that is low enough to support the kind of behavior described by Anderson and
Young. If a more preferable deal should enter the picture after the contracting
stage, it should be coming from other Norwegian exporters. In the model in
chapter 2 the outside option of the Russian importer therefore takes the form
of a possibility to contract a more preferable price once the true distribution of
contracted prices is unveiled.
Secondly and more importantly Norwegian exporters should be able to fore-
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see the potential repudiation and contract at a price that prohibits ex-post op-
portunism. That is suggest a price low enough to remove the benefit of recon-
tracting ex-post. It is implicitly assumed that all firms match in the first round
regardless of price suggested by the Norwegian firm. Complete matching is en-
sured by the Russian importers’ default alternative. If the Norwegian’s price is
too steep, the importer can always accept and not pay. The nonstrategic nature
of Anderson and Young’s contract price can be supported by the assumption
of risk neutrality. If the expected price is the same in both markets then risk
neutral sellers will not be willing to reduce their contract price because the are
indifferent to repudiation as long as it is not associated with some additional
cost. Risk neutrality seems a rather strict assumption in the case of Norwegian
fisheries considering the amount of investments and vulnerability of especially
fish farmers to downward price trends. It seems plausible that exporters strictly
prefer a guaranteed contract to stochastic price realization. Although risk aver-
sion does not enter the following model explicitly, the effect is ensured by the
fact that expected profit is increasing in stability so traders will prefer stability
as under explicit risk aversion.
Despite it’s ambition the model below remains crude and subject to future
improvements. Issues such as repeatedness, price convergence and the effects of
in market price on export price will be discussed briefly in section 2.6.
2.2 Formal Modeling
Let us begin by assuming a population of Norwegian and Russian firms who
wish to engage in cross-border trade. The model focuses on the bilateral trade
relation between one Norwegian and one Russian firm who are constitute the
players of the game. Throughout the text subscripts n and m will refer to the
Norwegian and Russian player respectively . In the beginning of the game,
time = t, each Norwegian firm chooses its export price XE , the two countries’
firms are randomly paired and the firms enter the foreign trade market. In the
following we investigate pairwise relations and explicitly model the first three
periods of a game with indefinite horizon.
When two firms pair they sign a long term contract where the Norwegian
firm agrees to deliver some amount of produce at the price XE at the beginning
of each period for two periods. This amount is for simplicity normalized to one.
Once the firms have entered, all firms learn the distribution of all export prices.
We assume for simplicity that this distribution is uniform. Thus, for any XE
there is scope for improving one’s deal by ∆XE for the Norwegian firm and
∆XE
′
for the Russian firm.
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Thus
Prob(X < XE) = U(X) =
XE −X
X −X ∀X ∈ (X,X) (2.1)
Figure 2.1: The Distribution of XE and the Interpretation of ∆XE
From Figure 2.1 we see the possibilities the firms face for any XE . The as-
signed probabilities λn and λm can be interpreted as the Norwegian and Russian
firm’s probability respectively of finding a partner willing to trade at a more
preferable export price. These always sum to one, λn + λm = 1. The distribu-
tion becomes known first after all firms have matched, but before transactions
have been fully completed. The scope for improving the export price is taken
into account by Russian firms before they make the decision to abide or renege.
Having received the first shipment as agreed, the Russian firm realizes this
produce in the Russian market at an exogenous in market price XIM . The
Russian firm is then faced by the choice of either to abide by the contract and
pay XE or to renege the contract and pay nothing. If so the defaulting Russian
firm exits the market and is forced to pay a greater out of market search cost,
than firms that end up out of the market having chosen the abide strategy. The
Russian firm than earns a renege profit XIM , the Norwegian firms earns nothing
but must pay the out of market search cost γnCn in order to reenter in t+ 2.
If the Russian firm abides by the contract, the equilibrium is a cooperative
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one. Both firms acquire a t+ 1 payoff XABn = X
E and XABm = X
IM −XE and
face a new strategic situation. They must decide whether to rely on the long
term contract and stay with their existing partner or to search for a new one
which involves a cost. Depending on both players’ actions equilibrium specific
profits are realized at t+2. Since the two players’ choices regarding Stay-Search
are taken simultaneously resulting payoffs are determined in a static sub-game.
Figure 2.2 describes the chain of events and profit realization.
Figure 2.2: Game Overview
For simplicity I assume that parameter values do not change for the entire
duration of the game. As the game unfolds strategies chosen initially regarding
the static Stay-Search game remain optimal every period. The assumption also
applies to the Abide-Renege sub-game taking place prior to the Stay-Search deci-
sion. This stability assumption is made to ensure easy comparison of immediate
and future profits.
We analyze the game by backward induction starting with the static Stay-
Search game.
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2.3 To Stay or To Search?
In the static Stay-Search game each player faces four possible expected payoffs.
To avoid repeated specification the equilibrium specific profits specified below
are universalized. Subscripts i and j refer to the players. i is the player under
scrutiny while j is the opposing player. The superscripts 1 and 2 refer to actions
Stay and Search respectively. The first number indicates the action chosen by
player i and the second - the action chosen by player j. Thus pi21i can refer to
the Norwegian player n’s payoff if he searches and the Russian player stays, or
the Russian player m’s payoff if she searches and the Norwegian player stays.
Player i ’s equilibrium specific payoff for any strategy pair is simply pii, and can


























+ (1− λi)XABi −
Ci
δi











If both players play Stay they get the payoff postulated in the contract.
If, on the other hand, both play Search player i finds a better partner with
probability λi. If he does not succeed there is a certain probability (λj) that
his current partner has found a better partner whereupon he is forced to exit
the market and earns piOMi . If player j also does not succeed the two players
continue their trade relation also in period t+ 2.
Ci is a sunk cost incurred by searching. It is discounted backwards by a
discount factor δi because this cost is incurred in the period prior to profit
realization, that is in period t+1. In the expression for out of market profit Ci
is augmented by γi > 1. γi is thus the ratio of sunk search costs for firms out
of the market relative to search costs for firms in the market and represents the
difference in establishment costs for firms in and out of the market as argued
above 5.
5It might seem overly simplistic, but I feel that modeling the different establishment
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It is a goal of this paper to to point out possible determinants of stable
relations. In the context developed above this implies the determinants of a
Stay-Stay equilibrium in t+ 2. In order to identify possible conditions for sta-
ble trade relations it is most beneficial to concentrate on the two symmetric
equilibria. For any strategy pair Search-Search or Stay-Stay to be a Nash Equi-
librium neither firm can regret its decision. In order to determine the conditions
for either equilibrium I proceed by comparing pay-offs from playing symmetric
strategies to pay-offs from playing the alternate strategy. I begin by deriving
the Norwegian conditions for both equilibria. But first I state out of market
profit in the Search-Search equilibrium. It is this out of market profit that will
figure in the comparisons to follow.












H = δi + δ2i − δ2i (1− λi)λj
and
K = 1− δ2i (1− λi)λj
2.3.1 Norwegian Equilibrium Conditions
For the strategy pair Search-Search or Stay-Stay to be a Nash Equilibrium nei-
ther firm can regret its decision.
Nash equilibrium conditions for Search-Search
















(search) costs as linear combinations of each other is sufficient to illustrate the point that
these costs differ depending on firms’ position with respect to the export action.
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⇒ λnλm(1− δn − δ2n)XE+λn(1− δ2nλm)∆XE
≥ (1− λmδn (δn + γnλn)) Cn
δn
(2.2)
Nash equilibrium conditions for Stay-Stay





⇒ Cn ≥ δnλn∆XE (2.3)
Comparing expressions 2.2 and 2.3 allows us to investigate the possibility of two
equilibria in the Stay-Search game
λnλm(1− δn − δ2n)XE + λn(1− δ2n)∆XE




⇒ ∆XE ≥ δ
2
n + δn − 1
δnλnγn
XE (2.4)
Given 2.3 the Norwegian firm will prefer not too search because the search
costs exceed the expected gain. But by 2.2, should the Russian firm search, an
alternative cost is added to not searching due to the emerging chance of being
forced to leave the market. For δn > 0, 618 expression 2.4 constitutes a positive
lower limit to ∆XE compatible with 2.2.6 Should ∆XE fall below this value the
incentive for the Norwegian firm to search is insufficient to force a Search-Search
equilibrium. That is to say if the Norwegian firm initially achieves a sufficiently
high export price, he will see himself served best by staying even taking into
consideration the risk of having to leave the market.
2.3.2 Russian Equilibrium Conditions
The Russian conditions for Nash equilibria are computed in the same man-
ner as for the Norwegian firm, keeping in mind that for the Russian firm
XABm = X
IM −XE and ∆XABm = ∆XE
′
.
Nash equilibrium conditions for Search-Search
pi22m ≥ pi12m
6The reader might justly ask whether the discount value δn > 0, 618 is a plausible one.
Perhaps it is not. But on the other hand neither is it plausible that the game ends in t + 2.
Adding more periods to the game would provide more periods of sure profit to be discounted
up against possible gain and consequentially a lower the required discount factor.
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⇒ λmλn(1− δm − δ2m)(XIM−XE) + λm(1− δ2mλn)∆XE
′
≥ (1− λnδm(δm + γmλm)) Cm
δm
(2.5)
Nash equilibrium conditions for Stay-Stay
pi11m ≥ pi21m
⇒ Cm ≥ δmλm∆XE′ (2.6)
Comparing expressions 2.5 and 2.6
⇒ ∆XE′ ≥ δ
2
m + δm − 1
δmλmγm
(XIM −XE) (2.7)
2.3.3 Joint Equilibrium Conditions
Expressions 2.2-2.7 implicitly define intervals of XE compatible with different
static sub-game equilibria. 2.3 defines a lower limit to XE . For XE < XE(2.3)
Search becomes a dominant strategy for the Norwegian player. Equivalently 2.6
defines an upper limit to XE for the Russian player. Simultaneously 2.4 defines
an upper boundary to XE after which Stay becomes the dominant strategy
for the Norwegian player. 2.7 has the same function for the Russian player.
Whereas there is a unique solution to XE(2.4), X
E
(2.7) leaves one degree of freedom
and hence a variable solution dependent on the Russian in market price XIM .
What I will call the Stable Relations Equilibrium, characterized by some
XE = XE∗, is the pure strategies Stay-Stay equilibrium and is found along an
interval in (X∗, X
∗
) where Stay is simultaneously dominant for both players,
and along an interval where Stay is dominant for the Russian player, though
not for the Norwegian player.
Figure 2.3: Placement of Interval Limits and the Simultaneous Dominance Ex-
port Price
The simultaneous dominance interval can be found by first determining the
CHAPTER 2. A SEARCH MODEL 22
point where X(2.4) = X(2.7). Since X(2.4) is constant and X(2.7) is strictly in-
creasing in XIM , X(2.4) ≤ X(2.7) for values of XIM greater than or equal to
the value of XIM for which X(2.4) = X(2.7). First we normalize such that
X = 0 and X = 1.
Then ∆XE = 1−XE ;∆XE′ = XE , such that
2.4→
(




= λn = 1−XE
⇒ XE = δnγn
δn(1 + δn + 2γn)− 1
and
2.7→ XE = δ
2




















δn(1 + δn + 2γn)− 1
δmγm








δn(1 + δn + 2γn)− 1
)2
δmγm
δ2m + δm − 1
− δnγn
δn(1 + δn + 2γn)− 1 (2.8)
Equation 2.8 defines the lower limit to in market prices for which there
exists an export price, XE , such that Stay is dominant for both players. For
the interval where Stay is not simultaneously dominant, the Norwegian player
is given some liberty to influence the equilibrium. If he appoints a price XE >
XE(2.7), there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Optimal Export Price
The Norwegian player can never set a binding price better than XE = X(2.7).
Thus in the absence of simultaneous dominance, profit at the binding price is
compared with profit in mixed strategies. This is because the action preferred
by both players will depend on which action the other has chosen. We sidestep
the mixed strategies equilibrium, but keep in mind the consequences for profit
as compared to equilibrium in pure strategies. In mixed strategies the Russian
player will play Stay and Search with probabilities such that the Norwegian
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is indifferent between his two strategic choices and vice versa. Hence by the
conditions for the two Nash Equilibria in pure strategies - any resulting weighted
average will yield payoffs less than or equal to payoffs in either of the pure
strategies equilibria. This applies to both players.
2.4 Renege or Abide?
Prior to period t+1 the Russian firm consciously compares the expected payoff
of her two available actions. If piRenegem ≥ piIMm the Russian firm defaults on
her payment and exits the market completely until the next period. It incurs
reentry cost γˆC and reenters the market in t+2. γˆ ≥ γ, thus γˆ can be given the
interpretation as punishment for cheating. In sake of computational simplicity
we assume that firms with a repeated default history are identified with out
cost so that such behavior brings the firm permanently out of the market. Thus
default is not strategically considered for more than one period. piORm is out of
market profit having reneged. It differs from the general out of market profit
by the search cost.
Formally
piRenegem = X








piRenegem ≥ piIMm ⇒ XIM + δm(piIMm −
γˆCm
δm










XE + (1− δm)pim (2.9)
2.9 defines an upper limit to the the in market price after which Renege
becomes the preferred action for period t+1. When in market price is sufficiently
large short term gains out-weigh the costs. We also see how increased XE
reduces the threshold.
2.5 Predictions
I have built a crude model of Norwegian-Russian trade. It states that stability in
trade relations is partly a function of to what degree the cooperative equilibrium
can be sustained and partly a function of stability in the cooperative equilibrium
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outcome. Stability in the cooperative equilibrium is found along a price interval
where both trading parties find their terms of trade sufficiently preferable to not
induce search efforts. An export price is more likely to be within such an interval
if it is not at the extremes of the export price range depicted in figure 2.3. In the
cooperative equilibrium we should thus expect a quadratic relationship between




Figure 2.4: Proposed Price-Stability Relationship
2.5.1 Stability Inducing In Market Price
There is a positive relationship between in market prices and stability. The
higher the Russian firm’s profit margin for a given export price, the less likely
is she to engage in costly search activities.
XˆIM is the in market price for which there exists an export price XE such
that Stay becomes simultaneously dominant for both players and can be given
the interpretation of a stability threshold. As XˆIM increases, increasingly high
in market prices are needed to support long term relations. This is because as
XˆIM increases, a higher XE is needed satisfy the Norwegian player which in
turn demands a higher in market price for the Russian player to prefer the long
run relationship






> 0: Increased reentry costs make being outside the market
more costly compared to search costs and the gain from searching. Thus higher
reentry costs make firms less reluctant to abstain from searching and increases
the stability inducing threshold. This result is in opposition to general con-
clusions in sunk cost theory for international trade where the presence of sunk
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< 0: Increased future value eases the consequences of leaving
the market because profits at reentry are given greater weight, making it less
urgent to utilize the possibilities of instant gain. An increased discount factor is
stability generating since it is the risk of involuntarily leaving the market that
induces search activity.
We should expect instability to subside as in market prices increase. Re-
garding reentry costs as opposed to in market search costs, these are likely to
differ across product groups. The model furthermore unfortunately ignores the
possibility of multiple trade relations. It might be prudent to expect some effect
from multiple trade relations. If a firm is still in the market with other prod-
ucts, its reentry costs could be lower. Firms that export a variety of products
might thus be less exposed to instability in their trade. In terms of the model,
γ might be function of the number of trade relations a firm has established in
the market.
2.5.2 Cooperative Equilibrium and the In Market Price
























is another threshold. As long as XIM ≤ XIM long run loss outweighs
short run gain from reneging. Increased search costs increase this threshold
because out of market profit depends negatively on the payment necessary to
reenter. Not surprisingly, the ”penalty” cost from reneging reduces its appeal.
Increased XE reduces the Russian player’s expected gain from present and fu-
ture transactions making short run gain more inviting. As expected payoff in
the cooperative equilibrium increases, the in market price necessary to induce
renegation increases. Expected payoff in the cooperative equilibrium increases
with the stability in this equilibrium7.
The effect of an increased Russian discount factor is ambiguous. On the one
hand it increases the value of future loss as opposed to instant gain. On the
other hand it increases payoff upon reentering compared to the cost of reenter-
ing. It seems reasonable that in practical life the former effect dominates. We
should expect an increased Russian discount factor to support the cooperative
equilibrium.
7For proof se appendix
CHAPTER 2. A SEARCH MODEL 26
2.6 Issues
The number of players has not been specified. One could expect that if the num-
ber of players in one of the populations were to decrease / increase significantly
compared to the players in the other population then it would become harder
for players from the abundant population to match. This is true. One might be
tempted to make the distribution of prices endogenous on the number of players.
I do not feel that this would be the correct approach. The model does not give
grounds to predict which firms will exit the market, apart from the fact that
firms in the center will experience greater stability. Mass market exit of export
firms could have two plausible effects on the price distribution equation 2.1 and
figure 2.1. Firstly the upper and lower bounds could change truncating the ex-
port price range. Secondly one might experience a lower density of offers in the
extremes of the export price range. The second effect, with unchanged upper
and lower limits to the export price range, would change the price distribution
leading to increased kurtosis. The first and second effect would both make for
less gain from search efforts and increased stability. Since the results are the
same, one can treat increased kurtosis as a de facto truncation of the feasi-
ble price interval and stick with the uniform distribution as an approximation.
Such an approach avoids unnecessary modeling complications. A significant
discrepancy in the number of Norwegian and Russian players could instead be
fortunately integrated into the model by increased search costs. An increase
in the number of exporters could also potentially distort the distribution if the
new firms found it optimal to price mid-range. It seems timely to jump ahead
a little and point to figure 3.1. As can be seen from the figure, prices are not
uniformly distributed and the choice of uniformity in section 2.2 must be seen
as a computational simplification. To the discussion of the effect of changes
in the number of players one might add, that although there is some firm and
trade level exit and entry, the shape of the price distribution seems to remain
relatively unaffected over the years 1996-2004.
While I have chosen a finite game, a repeated game could potentially provide
important insights. In particular one could try to identify a system of collective
enforcement through a repeated game by the application of folk theorems. An
especially interesting concept for our setting is indefinitely repeated games -
when the number of stages is not commonly known (eg. Neyman, 1999) . The
recent ”salmon crisis” between Norway and Russia shows that trade with Russia
is subject to political instability. While the game reached its final stage quite
unexpectedly for Norwegian exporters, one might expect that Russian importers
had some chance to see this coming. Although this type of asymmetric infor-
mation is interesting, the data at hand does not allow to straight forwardly test
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hypothesis’ about the Russian players. Repeatedness was therefore sacrificed
above to allow for hypothesis’ and explanatory variables that could be tested
up against data. It would be possible to model the game above as a repeated
one, but this would not lead to testable results different from the ones already
in the model.
On the micro-level firms should be able to achieve stability by avoiding
extreme pricing behavior. If all Norwegian realize this and find such behavior
optimal as proposed by the model, then on the macro-level, one should expected
export prices to converge as firms learn the rules of the game. The model only
treats firms’ first few periods in the Russian market. Obviously the story of
the Russian market for Norwegian seafood does not end after period t + 2. A
natural extension of the model is that if players are able to learn the rules of the
game, one should experience price convergence in result. Jumping ahead again
to figure 3.9, the price convergence prediction seems to be accurate. Hence the
assumption of uniformly distributed prices over time seems seems a rather far
fetched one. Unfortunately incorporating such changes in players’ beliefs over
time would be prohibitively complicated and is one of the reasons the model is
not modeled as a repeated one. One of the major faults of the model is that




3.1 Data and Methodology
At hand is an extensive set with data for all Norwegian fish exports for the
years 1996-2004. In its raw form it consists of more than 57 000 observations on
1069 firms exporting 297 goods to 200 countries in the years 1996 - 2004. Each
observation is identified by the firm exporting and which product it exports.
One firm may export several products. This results in several observations will
the same firm identification. I will investigate only exports going to Russia.
In this reduced form the data set counts 2797 observations. Reshaping the
data set into long form such that for each firm-product pair there is a separate
observation for each year leaves over 24 000 observations.
The goal of this chapter is to try to detect which, if any, factors influence
stability. To this end I define a trade as the export of a certain good by certain
firm. A trade is defined for all years so it may repeat itself throughout the
period.
If one is to link the present data to the model in chapter 2, the actual obser-
vations must be assumed to represent realizations of the cooperative equilibrium
described in section 2.3. In chapter 2 the cooperative equilibrium was charac-
terized by a pair of strategies, and the potentially observable result where one
or both players stay in or leave the market. In this case it seems tractable to
measure stability along the time-trade dimensions, as the probability of leaving
the market at any given time. Using a binary variable for exit one could apply
probit analysis to investigate what increases the chance of a trade falling out of
the market at any given time.
On the other hand as the outcome of trade in this equilibrium was modeled
to be probability driven, one can only hope that the true distribution of sev-
ered trade will be revealed by repeated observations over time. Thus it seems
28
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appropriate to model the stability of a trade measured over some time period
as a function of the history of strategic choices with respect to price and exter-
nal factors such as growth in domestic demand. Such an approach creates an
econometric challenge because in the empirical model the left-hand endogenous
variable will be measured along one dimension - on the trade level, while the
right-hand exogenous variables are measured along two dimensions - trade and
time. Alternatively one could choose to generate the mean of variables such
as price and GDP growth across across time removing one dimension from the
right-hand variables. Such an approach though would abstract from the notion
that overall stability is a function of a set of strategic choices that each are made
in a separate time period conditional on the external conditions specific to that
particular time period.
Since generating means across time does not qualitatively effect regression
results and the idea that time specific strategic choice effects stability aggre-
gated over time is central, I choose to stick to measuring stability over time and
keeping the specific prices, observation of GDP growth for each year as separate
observations. I suggest interpreting the year-wise realizations of each trade as
separate transactions. Each transaction constitutes a separate observation and
is linked up to the stability measure of the trade to which it belongs. Thus the
following regressions investigate whether there is a link between the properties
of each transaction and the stability of which they are a part. A more detailed
discussion is provided in section 3.5.
The main hypothesis’ are:
H 1 Stability is negatively affected by deviations in price from the market mean
H 2 Sunk costs have a negative affect on stability. This hypothesis will be
tested be means of proxies
H 3 Growth in domestic demand positively affects stability
H 4 There are other time specific effects at play that are not identifiable in the
data - possibly improved institutions
For expositional reasons the variables in addition to price are presented in
separated regressions. A control regression for multi collinearity is provided in
table B.1.
3.2 The Empirical Model
The dependent variable in the model is Si, a measure of trade stability. It
represents the number of years a given trade was positive relative to potential
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years of positive trade. The idea is is do investigate the determinants of trade
stability. Si is discussed more closely in section 2.6
The model in chapter 2 gave grounds to expect a quadratic relation between
a firm’s price strategy and the stability. We also saw how stability might depend
on the cost of establishing a trade relation when one is out of the market, i.e
has no partner, compared to the cost of establishing a new relation when one is
in the market.
Accordingly I choose to estimate the following econometric model:
Si = β0 + β1Pi + β2P 2i + βiX+ ei (3.1)
The quadratic form in equation 3.1 is chosen because the theoretical model
presupposed that deviations from from mean market price both to the left and
to the right of the export price distribution resulted in decreased stability. In
equation 3.1 stability will increase for some interval of Pi, reach a maximum
and then decrease.
The alternative log-specification of equation 3.1 would render a concave, but
monotonically increasing, relation between stability and export price. The log
specification would ensure the effect of increasing price to satisfy the exporter’s
incentive constraint, but does not allow finding a maximum with respect to
price without introducing the importer’s incentive constraint as constraint to
the maximization problem. This feature is already internalized in the current
specification of equation 3.1. Although I do not explicitly provide the exporter’s
maximization problem, the current specification of equation 3.1 seems accurate
enough and more tractable compared to the log-alternative. Especially if one
takes into consideration the relationships presupposed in chapter 2. From an
empirical point of view the quadratic form also provides better fit.
The variables signify:
• Si - Stability in exports. Si is a measure of each individual transaction and
is equal to the overall stability measure of trade to which the transaction
belongs. Hence Si is calculated on the trade level.
Si =
∑
t↔ vτt > 0
T − (t ∗ −1) (3.2)
t period denominator, t∗ entry year, τ trade denominator; vτt trade value
at time t ;T total periods in the sample, T = 9.
• Pi is price the at which each transaction was realized, relative to the
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Subscript i is the transaction identifier and is a combination of firm, prod-
uct and time identifiers f,k and t. Thus transaction prices in the denomi-
nator are summed across firms exporting product k in time t.
For each firm there are observed a number of prices - one for each product
exported. These prices constitute a firm’s price strategy.
• X is a vector of supplementary explanatory variables and is meant to
capture most notably cost and time effects.
After entry, exit and time in the market have been quantified observations of
zero trade were removed. The observations of zero trade yield missing values for
price and hence also for relative price and are thus not included in the regression
analysis. Removing these observations was done to simplify gaining an overview
of the data.
The expression for relative price is based on a simple and not weighted aver-
age. Using a simple average often leaves the results of empirical analysis prone to
distorting effects disturbances in the data. To avoid unnecessary noise analysis
is based on a truncated data set. Firm level trade data are at special risk of mea-
surement errors. Manually inserted data can easily be registered wrongly with
an extra zero or so. In aggregated trade data the effect of such typos is reduced -
this is not the case here. To avoid the worst measurement errors I base my anal-
ysis on observed values of relative price within a 98 % confidence interval around
the observed mean. The observed mean and standard deviation of relative price
are 0.996 and 0.4339 Assuming the Pi ∼ N(1, 0.442), 98 % of observed rel-
ative prices should be in the interval (1− (0.44× 2.3056), 1 + (0.44× 2.3056))
or (−0.01, 2.01). As the interval’s left limit goes beyond 0, only values of relative
price above 2 are removed from the data prior to further analysis.
After missing values had been removed, 118 observations displayed a relative
price of more than 2. 5101 observations stayed within (0, 2). Figure 3.1 shows
the distribution of relative price in this range. In the following, regressions will
be based on the part of the data where relative price is in the discussed interval.
A weighted average where the trade’s contribution to overall export value
for a given product was taken into consideration could be an option but has not
been chosen for the following reasons.
Since stability in the model is measured trade wise indifferent to the value
the trade is seems natural that the average price be measured also on this level.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Relative Price for Pi ∈ (0, 2), STATA 9.0
Taking a weighted average and measuring the de-facto market price can be
argued to be a departure from the assumption that the trade flow reported by
one firm for one product is in fact one trade. A weighted average would act as a
confession that the ”trades” with large value are in fact many trades. I choose
to stay loyal to my initial assumptions. Further more involving trade size into
the equation might attract disturbance by some spurious effects since stability
in practice very well might be dependent on size and size does appear explicitly
in the model but would appear in the expression for relative price. In the model
in chapter 2 I studied trade, the size of which was normalized to unity. A simple
average is based on the price of a trade when it has been normalized to unity is
suitable and is considered to be a satisfactory measure since the most extreme
observations have been removed.
3.3 Regressions
3.3.1 Price Strategy and Stability
Regressing the chosen continuity measure on relative prices and squared relative
prices yields a relationship in line with the theoretically anticipated one. As can
be seen from the regression results in table 3.1 the coefficient of price is positive,
whereas the coefficient of squared price is negative. Both are significant at the
0.01 level. This one dimensional model does not display a convincing goodness
of fit, R2 = 0.037. Nevertheless we find support in the data for the relationship
illustrated in figure 2.4. Figure 3.2 shows the empirical relationship.
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Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Figure 3.2: Relationship between Stability and Relative Prices as proposed by
STATA 9.0
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between Stability and Relative Prices as proposed by
STATA 9.0
If we add a scatter plot of the observations to the fitted values curve, fig-
ure 3.3, we see that price does not tell us the whole story behind trade stability.
3.3.2 Cost Effects
In section 2.5 we saw that stability was modeled to depend negatively on cost of
establishing a trade relation when out of the the market relative to establishing a
new relation when in the market. This was due to the fact that if player n when
in the market did not search this could render Search optimal for n’s partner
m. Such a strategy might bring n out of the market, a prospect that becomes
increasingly costly as the out of market search cost increases. Strategy Search
would at least reduce the chance of leaving the market. Such a line of argument
applied equally to both players and thus increased out of market search costs
leads to more searching activity on behalf of both players. Departing from the
model most firms are likely to be involved in more than one trade. If trade is
broken off in one trade these firms do not necessarily fall out of the market.
Reestablishment costs might be less for trades conducted by firms who are
involved in several trades. Firms that are in the market in many trade i.e. with
many products should experience some learning effects reducing reestablishment
costs. Thus we might expected trades conducted by firms who are involved in
several trades to be more stable.
Table 3.2 displays the regression results when the core regression has been
extended to include the number of trades the trading firms is involved in. The
variable NOT is the number of observed trades per firm in a given year.
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The coefficients from the core regression have the same sign as in table 3.1
and are highly significant. But β3 comes out with a significantly negative co-
efficient. Empirically, increased participation in the export market on behalf
of the Norwegian firm seems to have a negative effect on stability of the par-
ticular trade over time. This result is in opposition to the predictions made in
section 2.5. One reason in compliance with traditional sunk costs theory might
be that fish exports are generally characterized by relatively low sunk costs and
the export markets are therefore prone to a significant entry-exit activity. Such
behavior might be particular to firms who are involved in several trades, which
would explain the negative effect on stability. It must be mentioned that in the
control regression in table B.1 the coefficient for NOTi comes out insignificant.
Proxying an unknown cost structure is not an easy task with the data at
hand. Bernard and Wagner (1998) find that in addition to sunk costs that must
be incurred by all firms, there are also several firm specific effects that influence
the chance of entering the export market. I our case a firms experience from the
Russian market, might serve as such a firm specific effect. Relying on learning
effects to reduce sunk costs of market entry the length of a firms involvement in
the Russian export market should have a positive effect on reducing such sunk
costs. Medin (2006) finds that being in the market one year increases the chance
of being in the market next year by 13-53 % this is in line with findings in Roberts
and Tybout (2006). Although it is quite tempting to attribute such results to
the hysteris argument, Melchior (2006) comments that the results also could
be an effect of learning processes. One could chose to create an explanatory
variable equal to the difference between a trade’s entry and exit year. But one
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would be creating a variable algebraically linked to the dependent variable and
and no doubt significant results without economic sense. Experience in the
market is therefore measured on the firm level. The results from a regression
taking into consideration the firms’ time experience in the Russian market is
given in table 3.3. The variable timeinmark is the firm’s overall exit year from
the Russian market less its initial entry year.














As could be expected β3 in table 3.3 is significantly positive. If firms learn
from being in the market over time, reducing sunk costs - then reduced sunk
costs, in our context search costs, lead to increased stability.
3.3.3 Time Effects
The data is clearly influenced by the developments in the Russian economy in the
period covered by the data. Norwegian fish exports fell as the Russian economy
plunged as consequence of the 1998 financial crisis. To help in understanding
what effects might be in play over time it is useful to take a look at what
happened in this time period.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the dynamics of Russian GDP growth. In 1998 Russia
experienced negative growth. In the following years growth has been stably
high after an initial boom. The initial boom in 1999 was to certain extent
the result of more favorable terms of trade because of the recent devaluation.
But in more recent years much of the initial exchange rate advantage has been
eaten up by a continuous strengthening of the rouble (OECD 2006). Soaring
oil prices have helped the Russian economy maintain a budget surplus, but in
recent years growth in the Russian economy has become steadily more driven
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Figure 3.4: Growth Rates of Russian GDP 1996-2004 STATA 9.0
Figure 3.5: Number of Trades per year 1996-2004 STATA 9.0
also by consumer demand (World Bank 2004, 2006). This increase in domestic
demand is noticeable also in the Norwegian fish export data.
The corresponding dynamics for the number of trades being concluded and
the mean value of this trades are illustrated in figures 3.5 and 3.6. The number
of trades being concluded fell in 1998 and regained its previous size shortly after.
The number of trades has since then remained stable on its pre-1998 level. The
mean value of each trade also slumped in 1998, but in opposition to the number
of trades it has increased steadily in course with the growth in Russian GDP.
Increased growth of GDP has a positive effect on stability in our sample,
as can be seen from table 3.4. Adding the GDP growth as an explanatory
variable has also increased goodness to fit to 0.2. Section 2.5 stated among
other that stability is positively related to the in market price, i.e. Russian
domestic demand. This was because increased in market prices increases the
Russian importer’s profit margin making it less attractive to incur search costs.
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Figure 3.6: Mean Trade Value 1996-2004 STATA 9.0
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Figure 3.7: Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation (Inflow) 1996-2004:
Source GKS, Russian Federal Statistics Service, STATA 9.0
Accepting GDP growth as a proxy for domestic demand offers support to the
findings of the model in chapter 2.
Changes in GDP growth rates is not the only interesting development in the
Russian economy. As can be seen from figure 3.7 foreign investments have soared
since 1999. Interestingly FDI does not maintain its share in the investment
activity. While the FDI inflow has remained surprisingly stable, foreigners have
been increasingly willing to provide various credits - the main component of
”Other Investments” (see figure 3.8). What has made Russia more credible?
Recent relative economic prosperity and the accompanying increased solvency
is sure to provide some of the explanation, but perhaps we are also witnessing
a perception that lawlessness has decreased since the turbulent nineties? On
the other hand the fact that FDI has not increased together with credits might
indicate that institutions have not improved. In any case it might prove fruitful
to add dummies for pre- and post-crisis periods to identify any net effect of time
reflecting qualitative changes that are hard to identify. Such changes might for
instance be linked to more efficient institutions. Table 3.5 contains the results
from the regression in table 3.4 after adding the mentioned dummies.
Table 3.5 reproduces statistically coefficients for all variables and a further
increase in goodness to fit, R2 ≈ 0, 3. Claiming that institutions are behind the
significant β4 and β5 would be jumping to conclusions. Nonetheless stability
does in fact increase with time, although we may be facing one of the deficiencies
of the chosen stability measure. See section 2.6 for comments on this.
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Figure 3.8: The Structure of Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation
1995-2003: Source GKS, Russian Federal Statistics Service
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Figure 3.9: The Standard Deviation of relprice 1996-2004, STATA 9.0
A Comment on Strategic Learning
The model in chapter 2 states that stability can be achieved by choosing an
export price XE that is profitable enough for the Russian importer to ensure
that Stay as the dominant strategy. A feasibility condition for the existence
of such a price was that it ensured Stay dominance also for the Norwegian
exporter. The model did not state however what would happen when Norwegian
and Russian players came to know the rules of the game. Departing from the
model it is reasonable to expect that as time goes on players players will start to
understand the different stability constraints and start to price closer and closer
to such a binding export price. In section 2.5 the stability inducing export
price was claimed to be close to the center of the export price distribution. If
players learn the rules of the game one should expect them to price closer and
closer to the mean export price, i.e. that the standard deviation of relative price
decrease with time implying a more peaked distribution of relative price. As
can be seen from figure 3.9 the standard deviation of the variable relprice does
in fact decrease, though not monotonically, over the time period. If players are
consciously pricing closer to the mean export price in order to effect stability,
then learning the rules of the game provides an alternative explanation for the
signs of β4 and β5 in table 3.5. Perhaps this type of learning also lies behind
the positive β3 in table 3.3.
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3.4 Conclusions
Through out chapter 3 I have investigated by means of OLS the determinants
of trade level stability in Norwegian fish exports to Russia in the years 1996-
2004. The point of departure has been predictions from the a theoretical model
built in chapter 2. This model focused on incentive compatible constraints
as stability determinants and the ability of Norwegian exporters to influence
stability through strategic pricing. The model’s main conclusion in respect
to this last strategic element was that stability increased as the export price
approached the mean price and decreased as one moved away from the center
of the distribution.
The predictions about the effect of strategic behavior have served as the
basis of empirical analysis throughout the chapter. After an initial regression
with only relative price as the explanatory variable, different components of
the incentive constraints summarized in section 2.3.3 were added. Variables
such as the number of trades a firm was involved in and the overall time the
firm had been in market were added to proxy the firms sunk search costs - a
major determinant of the firms choice whether to stay with its current partner
or to search for a new one. Russian GDP growth was added to proxy domestic
demand, another stability influencing effect.
The coefficients of relative and squared relative price remained significant
with the expected signs throughout all the regressions. The number of trades a
firm was involved in was found, contrary to what was expected, to have a neg-
ative effect on stability. But its effect proved insignificant in regression with all
explanatory variables conducted as a control for multi collinearity. The overall
time a firm had been in the market had a positive effect on stability. These
variables were added under the argument that as exporting firms are active in
the Russian export market they learn and thus face less sunk search costs when
temporarily out of the export action. In line with chapter 2 this reduces search
activity on behalf of the Norwegian exporter and increases stability. The growth
rate of GDP was also found to have a positive effect on stability. In chapter 2
increased in market price XIM increased the profit margin of the Russian im-
porter and reduces the attractiveness of searching for a new partner - increasing
stability.
Furthermore regressions found that there were time specific effects at play
net of GDP growth. Dummies for pre- and post-crisis periods showed a nega-
tive and positive effect on trade level stability. The link to improved institutions
was discussed as a possible explanation. Although such an explanation seems
probable, especially in the light of improved Russian creditworthiness, the ab-
sent increase in FDI points in a different direction. The following alternative
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explanation was launched. As firms come to know the market and the rules of
the game, they increasingly price in a binding way - increasing stability. Since
the Russian export market is a relatively young one taking into consideration
that it opened only 15 years ago and the changes that have taken place since,
the Norwegian firms’ learning will inevitably be correlated to time. Such a
prospect also brings in a supplementary interpretation of the effect of firms’
experience, over time, in the Russian export market. Alternatively we might
be witness to a taˆtonnement process in a maturing market where exporters of-
fering disequilibrium prices fall out of the market and reenter offering prices
closer to equilibrium. Elaborating such an approach could explain both the
price convergence and increasing stability observed in the data.
All variables were shown to have a significant effect on trade level stability.
Most variables also had the expected sign. One exception was the firms’ product
involvement in the Russian market. Regressions in chapter 3 generally support
the causal relations indicated in chapter 2. But many of the effects from the
theoretical model could not be proxied by the data at hand. One should fur-
thermore be careful to conclude that the variables from the empirical analysis
in fact reflect the effects they are meant to. More work in this field is sorely
need, but it is unfortunately not within the scope of this paper to embark on
such a task.
3.5 Issues
3.5.1 Measurement level of Si versus the measurement
level of independent variables
Above I mentioned issues arising from the fact that the left-hand dependent
variable is constructed as measure of stability over time, while the right-hand
explanatory variables are time specific. The option of aggregating also these
across time was mentioned. The core issue is that while one really has one
observation per trade with one corresponding stability measure and several ob-
servations of price - one for each year, the way of treating the data as is suggested
here treats each observed price as if it belonged to a separate observation. A
trade that exits for 3 years is treated not as one, but as three observations.
Price could also be aggregated across these 3 years, but apart from the intuitive
objection mentioned above there are also some technical difficulties with this
approach.
In the following regressions time dummies are introduced to identify quali-
tative effects apart from difference in purchasing power associated with doing
business in Russia in the pre- financial crisis period in opposition to doing busi-
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ness in the post-crisis period. A trade that has a history extending across these
two periods would end up with different values of the dummies depending on
the year at question hence both reducing the data set to containing the ”true”
amount of observation still leads to duplicate observations - and no essential
change compared to the initial situation. Reshaping the data set is also compli-
cated by the variables that do not have a separated observation for each year,
but also do not have a fixed value for all years.
To side-step this issue I suggest interpreting the year-wise realizations of
each trade as separate transactions. Each transaction constitutes a separate
observation and is linked up to the stability measure of the trade to which
it belongs. Thus the following regressions investigate whether there is a link
between the properties of each transaction and the stability of which they are
a part. Table B.2, appendix B provides a control where price, GDP growth
and number of trades have been aggregated across time. As can be seen from
the regression, results do not strongly differ from the ones presented in the
regressions above. Thus it seems that the chosen approach can be accepted.
3.5.2 Comments on the Stability Measure Si - firm entry
and final exit
The stability measure Si is based on the number of total nonzero trades since
market entry. Such a measure is biased towards firms who enter into a trade
late. These firms will have a small denominator in their stability measures,
see expression 3.2. Trades with entry early in the period of scrutiny will have
high denominators. The possibility of overall market exit increases the predica-
ment. A trade that entered the market in 1996 and left after 4 years because of
bankruptcy, takeover or other would have an unfairly low stability measure. De-
spite the present measures faults the closest substitute is not necessarily much
better. An alternative could be to replace the denominator in 3.2 with actual
time in the market - final exit year minus entry year. Such an approach though
would be biased towards ”one shot wonders”. Trades that are initiated and
permanently terminated one or two years later would receive a high stability
score, yet it is hard to argue that such behavior defines stability. Figure 3.10
takes a look at entry and exit into the Russian export market. As before entry
and exit is counted on trade, not firm level.
As we see from figure 3.10 there are many entries in the beginning of the
period and fewer as as time goes on. Conversely the number of exits is low in the
beginning, but picks up towards the end of the period. The overall number of
trades remains stable through out the period. As to Si, the entry-exit dynamics
are quite reassuring since it would be the opposite development that would have
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Figure 3.10: Entry and Exit Dynamics 1996-2004, STATA 9.0
fueled the bias discussed in the paragraph above. If lots of firms were exiting
early one would end up with artificially low stability measures. As can be seen
from figure 3.10 this is not the case.
3.5.3 Assumptions on the residuals ei
When conducting regression analysis on any empirical material one is at risk that
the assumptions implicit in regression analysis regarding the model’s residuals
do not hold.
The assumptions at question are:
A 1 E(ei) = 0
A 2 var(ei) = σ2 = var(Si)
A 3 cov(ei, ej) = cov(Si, Sj) = 0↔ i 6= j
The expectancy of ei in the regression displayed in table B.1 is very close to
zero, although significantly, statistically speaking, larger than zero. Figure B.2
provides an illustration. Figure B.3 shows that the residuals of this regression
plotted against fitted values. We see that although residuals are seemingly
dispersed over an equal area or have equal variance, the mean seems to decrease
with predicted level of stability, Sˆi. Although we don’t find direct evidence
of the fact that assumption A 2 is violated, we do seem to find that the model
systematically overestimates stability for trades with a low stability measure and
vice versa for trades with a relatively high stability measure. This is in apparent
violation of A 3. It might therefore be worth while to search for variables over
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which to cluster the data. This particular behavior on behalf of the residuals
might also be related to the aggregating of Si. It is unfortunately beyond the
scope of this paper to investigate these issues further.
Chapter 4
Results
In chapter 1 I argued that trade between Norway and Russia suffered from
Institutional Incompatibility. Although the two countries might have contract
enforcing mechanisms that ensure the efficiency of trade within the countries,
these contract enforcing mechanism do not apply in the same degree to cross
border trade. Inability to enforce contractual agreements for more than one
period ahead was chosen as a stylized example of this notion.
The results of imperfect contract enforcement were elaborated on in a formal
model in chapter 2. The main contribution of this model was to point out a new
dimension of the fact that there are two ends to the deal also in international
trade. Players were given among other the option to stick with their current
partner in a long run relationship, two periods, or search for a new partner after
one period. The main results were:
1. The stability in trade experienced by Norwegian exporters can be affected
by their strategic considerations regarding export price. Optimal pricing
with respect to trade stability would imply pricing in the mid-range of the
export price distribution.
2. Sunk out of market search costs may have a negative influence on trade
stability. This was because if out of market search costs were high, players
found it optimal to search in face of an increased chance of leaving the
market due to unilateral search activity from their opposing player.
Chapter 3 saw an empirical treatment of trade stability based on data for
Norwegian seafood exports to Russia. The implied price-stability relationship
was found consistent with the data and the coefficients of relative price and
squared relative price remained significant throughout a series of regressions.
There was some evidence that reduced search costs increased stability. However
47
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 48
the distinction between out of market search costs and in market search cost was
not drawn and the positive effect of a firm’s experience in the Russian market
may be a result of learning the rules of the game and utilization of strategic
pricing rather than reduction in out of market search costs through learning.
Improved stability was closely associated with time. As the years passed trades
seemed to become increasingly stable. There are several possible explanations
of this result. Among those that were discussed, growth in Russian GDP and
consequentially Russian demand for Norwegian seafood is the explanation that
has the closest link to the model in chapter 2. Increased domestic demand
increases the profitability for importers from any trade making it less urgent to
seek better terms of trade.
It was shown that there are time effects at play also net of GDP growth. The
quality of Russian contract enforcement institutions may have improved. Con-
tracts might not be as costlessly breached as in earlier times. Recent increases
in foreign trade credit and other credit to Russia indicate that this may be the
case. Of course increased creditworthiness is inevitably linked to improved sol-
vency. Interestingly; while the number of firms and trades being executed in the
market have returned to pre-crisis levels and the mean value of trades continues
to grow, the variation in export prices has decreased significantly. Although this
might be the result of increased competition as the Russian market matures, the
Russian market has not witnessed an increase in firms and only a slight increase
in trades. Price convergence need thus not be the result of reduced market con-
centration. The question remains unanswered whether Norwegian firms have
learned to price optimally so as not to induce unwanted search behavior.
This paper has focused on the need for Norwegian firms to strategically
handle differences in institutional structure between Norway and Russia. The
formal model showed that strategic thinking could influence trade stability and
that this line of research should not be ignored. The empirical analysis found
support for the ideas laid out in preceding chapters.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Solving for Out of Market Profit in the Search-
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A.2 Nash Equilibrium Conditions for Search-
Search
Norwegian firm:
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⇒ λnλm(1− δn − δ2n)XE+λn(1− δ2nλm)∆XE
≥ (1− λmδn (δn + γnλn)) Cn
δn
Russian equilibrium conditions are found equivalently
A.3 Comparing Expressions 2.2 and 2.3
λnλm(1− δn − δ2n)XE + λn(1− δ2n)∆XE




λnλm(1− δn − δ2n)XE + λn(1− δ2n)∆XE ≥ λn∆XE (1− λmδn(δn + γnλn))
λm(1− δn − δ2n)XE ≥ −λmδn∆XEλnγn
⇒ ∆XE ≥ δ
2
n + δn − 1
δnλnγn
XE
δ2n + δn − 1 ≥ 0?→
−1±√1− 4×−1
2
≈ −1± 2, 236
2
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δ2n + δn − 1 ≥ 0⇔ δn ≥ 0, 618
A.4 Renege or Abide?




piRenege ≥ piIMm ⇒ XIM + δm(piIMm −
γˆCm
δm
) ≥ XIM −XE + δmpim
solving for XIM
δm(XIM −XE + δmpim − γˆCm
δm
) ≥ −XE + δmpim
δmX




XE + (δmpim − pim) ≥ γˆCm
δm







XE + (1− δm)pim
A.5 Payoff Increasing in Stability?
pi11i ≥ pi22i ?
pi21i > pi
22







+ (1− λi)XABi −
Ci
δi
⇒ Ci ≥ δiλiXABi
A player will prefer to stay provided the stays if the cost is greater than the
expected gain. This was a prerequisite for the Nash Equilibria stated in sec-
tion 2.3 and it is assumed this inequality holds. Because pi21i > pi
22




Figure B.1: The Coase Theorem Fails under Asymmetric Information
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Figure B.2: Histogram of Residuals from Regression in Table B.1, STATA 9.0
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX 58
Figure B.3: Residuals versus Fitted Values from Regression in Table B.1, 9.0
